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Noncompetitive Pricing and Exchange
Rate Pass-Through in Selected U.S. and
Thai Rice Markets
K. K. YumkeUa, L, J. Unnevehr and P. Garcia*
A “pricing to market” mtemational trade model IS applied to U.S. and Thai rice
exports to high and middle income countries that are continuous rice importers. These markets
are characterized by strong quality preferences and highly inelastic demand, and thus exporters
may exercise market power. Evidence of noncompetitive pricing either through price
discrimination across destinations or through imperfect exchange rate pass-through is found in
this small but growing segment of the international rice trade.
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Evidence regarding the degree of
competition in the international rice trade is
mixed, Mitchel and Duncan show that rice and
coarse grain markets conform closely to an
oligopolistic model, with the U.S. as the price
leader, More recently, Karp and Perlot_f also
provide evidence of an oligopoly market in
international rice trade. In contrast, both Petzel
and Monke, and Uri find a high degree of
integration among international rice pnccs. Petzel
and Monke report that prices in the dominant long
grain trade move closely together after a short lag.
In comparing rice prices across grddcs and
markets, Uri concludes that there is a single world
market for rice.
To fwher investigate pricing behavior in
the international rice trade, this paper uses the
“pricing to market” model developed by Krugman,
and Knetter. This model allows an examination
of a new dimension of noncompetitive behavior--
the ability of export firms to exerctse market
power in response to exchange rate changes, In a
competitive market with constant marginal cost,
exchange rate changes should be fully reflected in
import prices. If exporters have rndrket power,
they can adjust mark-ups in particular markets as
exchange rates change. Thus, imperfect exchange
rate pass-through provides evidence of
noncompetitive pricing.
The paper focuses on market behavior in
a small but growing segment of the international
trade-- high and middle income countries that are
continuous Importers of rice, Rice demand in
high income markets is expected to increase
dramatically as a result of the recently concluded
GATT agreement (USDA). Consistent purchase
in these markets allows application of the pricing
to market model. For these importers, loyalty to
specific types of rice, from specific export origins,
is similar to brand loyalty for manufactured
products. Strong loyalty for particular types of
rice can cause demand within market segments to
be inelastic. In this context, the dominant
exporters, the U.S. and Thailand, may view the
ncc market not as “one market” but m a number
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of market niches with unique demand elasticities
for their products,
The paper first reviews the characteristics
of the markets selected for study, Then the
theoretical model of export pricing is presented,
which allows us to derive an empirical model and
testable hypotheses. The results of estimates for
the Thai and US, long grain rice markets and for
the U.S. parboiled rice market are presented, and
their implications for market behavior explored.
Export and Import Markets Selected
The structure of the world rice market
changed in the 1980s, On the supply side,
Thailand and the U.S. increased their combined
share of exports (table 1). In the 1970s, the
combined market share of the two countries was
40-45 percent, but increased to over 50 percent
during the 1980s, with Thailand accounting for
over 30 percent. The increasing dominance of
these two exporters leads to concern that they may
be able to exercise market power. The behavior
of U.S. and Thai rice export prices in the 1980s is
the focus of this study,
Whether these exporters are able to price
discriminate also depends on the nature of demand
in the world rice market. In the 1980s, import
demand shifted away from Asia, with rice Imports
growing in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin
America. Many south and southeast Asian
importers reduced their import demand due to
increased production following the green
revolution. For example, Indonesia was the
world’s largest importer of rice in the 1970s, but
did not import rice during several years in the late
1980s. This change in structure means that a
larger share of import demand comes from higher
income countries that are not traditional
producers.’
The selection of import markets is based
on both the magnitude of total exports to the
country and the frequency of purchase (i.e., the
occurrence of continuous rice shipments from
Thailand or the U.S. throughout the 1980s), The
model presented below requires continuous
observations on prices. Many rice importers trade
only infrequently in the international market, due
to trdde policies that seek to stabilize domestic
prices (Falcon and Monke). The selcc~ion criteria
therefore identified a particular segment of the
rice trade-- import markets in high income
countries with hmitcd or no production capacity.
Five major markets were idenlitied for
U.S. Long Grain white rice (code 0422130): the
European Community (EC), Canada, Iraq, Ivory
Coast, and Saudi Ardbia. For U.S. exports of
Long Gram Parboil (code 0422 120) the major
markets were: the EC, Candda, Ivory Coast, and
Saudi Arabia, Tdken together, U.S. exports in
these categories to these markets accounted for
about one-third of U.S. rice exports. Four
countries were identified as major and consistent
destinations for Thai long grain rice: IIong Kong,
Malaysia, Saudi AYdbia, and Singdpore. These
markets accounted for only 19 percent of
Thailand’s long grain rice exports of rice during
the 1980s. Thailand traditionally supplied the
Asian markets, and it is these traditional rice
producing countries that tend to participate in the
market infrequently (Falcon and Monke),
All of the eight markets selected are high
or middle income countries (as classiticd by the
World Bank). Four of the eight, Singapore, Hong
Kong, Cawada, and Saudi Arabia, have virtually
no domestic production of rice. In the other four
countries, production does not meet demand for
various reasons. In the JiC, most consumers
prefer long grain rice. Italy, the major J;uropean
producer, grows mostly short grain arborio rice
for its own consumption (McNitt; Kaosa-ard
.h.diano), The Ivory Coast and Malaysia both
produce rice, but food crop production has not
expanded as rapidly m tree crop exports m these
middle income countries. Iraq’s production has
been limited by its climate and possibly by the
disruptions of war.
Whether these regular purchasers of rice
face a more or Icss competitive market than
infrequent rice buyers is an empirical question.
Previous studies (c.g,, Siamwalla and Haykin)
have emphasized the role of high search costs in
creating imperfections in the international trade,
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Table 1. MarketShares of Leading RICCExporters, 1970-1990











































































































Source: FAO Trade Year Book, vmous issues.
However, regular purchasers may have inelastic
demand for imports due to relatively high income
and strong quality preferences.
One indicator of the potential for exercise
of market power is the dominance of an exporter
in a particular market. Table 2 presents the
exporters’ shares of rice imports in the selected
markets, The U.S. is the principal exporter to
Iraq and Canada, and supplies substantial shares
in Saudi Arabia and the EC, Thailand supplies
most of the rice for Singapore and Malaysia, and
a large portion in Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia, the
EC, and the Ivory Coast. The U.S. and Thailand
compete directly in Saudi Arabh and the EC;
Thailand also competes directly with China for the
Hong Kong market,2
Dominance of a partmdar exporter arises
in part from strong quality preferences. Not all
quality differences can be discerned from the
standard grades used by the two exporters,
because these describe only physical
characteristits, The U.S. is recognized as a
reliable supplier of both high quality parboiled
rice and high quality long grain white rice, U.S.
white rice tends w have higher amylose (firmer
cooked texture) than Thai rice, and this texture
characteristic is preferred by Middle Eastern
consumers and consumers of northern European
ongin (Kaosa-ard and Juliano), Thailand exports
both very high and very low quality white rice.
Thai rice tends to have a softer texture which is
preferred by Asian consumers. Thai fragrant rice
which has a soft texture commands a premium in
I-Iong Kong and Singapore markets (Kaosa-ard
and Juliano). These differences explain in part
the patterns observed in table 2.7
In addition to qua]ity preferences,
government Interventions m the rice trade also
phdy a role in determining market shares, SomeJ Agr and Applied Econ,, December, 1994 409
Table 2. Import Shares of US. and Tlm&nd m Markets w]th Continuous Rice Imports, 1980-88
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Sources: Tnvdimports foreach importer aefromtie FAOTrade Yewbook. U.S. exports by
destination are from USDA/FAS. Thai exports by destmauon are from Bank of Thadand Monthly
Bullemr.
a Due to tfre difficulty of correcting for intra-EC trade in the above sources, these data are from the FAO
Intergovernmental Group on Rice and represent the 1986-88 average.
‘ Other exporters to the Ivory Coast Include Pak]stan, Burma, and Vietnam.
‘ China provides 42 percent of Hong Kong imports.
of these import markets (Ivory Coast, Malaysia,
Saudi Arabia, Iraq) have government monopolies
on rice imports, and purchasing decisions may be
politically motivated. The U.S, government also
has promoted rice exports aggressively, especially
after 1985. The provision of export credits to Iraq
and Saudi Arabia has tied sales to U.S. suppliers,
and so have confessional sales to the Ivory Coast.
In summary, three factors suggest that
noncompetitive pricing may occur. First, two
exporters dominate the international rice trade.
Second, markets for continuous imports in high
and middle income countries are characterized by
strong quality preferences. The relatively high
incomes of consumers in these markets could
make demand inelastic for rice from a particular
source, Finally, U.S. sales promotions may serve
to tie certain markets to US. suppliers. Next, we
develop a model that allows us to test directly for
the noncompetitive pricing,
A Theoretical and Empirical Model of Price
Discrimination
An exporter with market power can use
exchange rate changes in order to “price to
market” (Krugman; Knetter). Assume that an
exporter maximizes profit by selling to N foreign
destinations, each with a unique demand function,
and that the exporter can behave as a monopolist,
segmenting markets and adjusting export prices to
bilateral exchange rate changes. Demand in each
market is represented as,
q,, = F(e,p,,)t’,, i = 1, ....N f = 1, ..*,T (1)410 Yurnkeilu, Unnevehr and Garcia Noncompetitive Pricing and Exchunge Rate Puss-Through
where p,, is price in terms of the exporter’s
currency, e,, is the exchange rate (importer’s
currency per unit of the exporter’s currency), and
v,, is a random variable that may shift demand m
market i in period I, The exporter’s cost is given
by
c, = C(zq,,)s, t= 1, ....T (2)
where C, measures costs in the exporter’s
domestic currency units, which are summed over
all destination markets, and i5, is a random
variable that may shift the cost function (e.g.,
changes in input prices) in period t. Substituting
equation (1) for q,,, the maximization problem
becomes
max II = X~i#’(e,p,,)v,,] - C{XIJf’(erfl,,)vr,] }6,. (3)
Differentiating equation (3) with respect to p,, and
expressing in terms of elasticities, the first order
conditions are
p,, = c, (sTi(&’,-l)) i = 1, ...fi t = 1, ....T (4)
where c, equals the marginal cost of production in
period t (C’8,), and s’, is the demand elmticity
for imports in importing country i in pcnod t,
Equation (4) states that the price discriminating
monopolist will equate margiwdl cost to rndrginal
revenue in each market.
If the elasticity of demand in the
importing country is not constant, then changes in
the biPdteral exchange rate between the exporter
and the importer will cause the optimal markup to
change. When demand schedules are less (more)
convex than a constant elasticity schedule,
elasticity of demand incrcascs (dccreascs) with
increase in price (Knetter). Markups of price over
cost fall (rise) when the exporter’s currency
appreciates.
To test whether exporters can vary prices
across destinations or with changes in exchanges
rates, we define an empirical model,
lfli, = a + Z @~, + Z LJ, + Z ~,lne,,+ ~~,1
.= 1 1, ....Nand t = 1, ....T (5)
where P,, is the export unit value to market
destination i in period t; u is a regression
constant; @,measure the time effect corresponding
to lhe t periods; k, measure the country effect
corresponding to the individual i destination
markets; the x, and x, arc sets of dummy variables
used to specify the time and country effects,
respectively; and u,, is the error term,4 The e,,
reflects the market-specific exchange rate in
period t,where the observations corresponding to
the prices in country i are the market-specific
exchange rates, and zero otherwise. The ~,
measure the exchange rate pass-through for the
individual ~countries. The export unit values and
the cxchangc rates, as indicated in equation (5),
are expressed in natural logs.
The formulation in equttion (5) allows
statistical tests for three hypotheses.
Null Hypothesis. H,, : ~,= O k,= O
In a competitive market, export prices will be the
same for all destinations. There will be no
country effccts (1, = 0), and changes in the
bilateral exchange rates will not affect bi~dterdi
export prices ([3,= 0). Note that the destination-
specific variables may affect the export unit
values, but if markets arc integrated these effects
will be transmitted across destinations and are
thus accounted for by the time effects, 63,,m the
model. Hence, in a competitive market, k, = ~, =
O, and the time effects, @,, measure factors
affecting price for all destinations.
Noncompetitive pricing can take one of
two forms,
Alternative Hypothesis 1. HA: ~, # O
If demand elasticities vmy with exchange rate
changes, then optimal markup over margmal cost
for a monopohstic exporter will vary with
exchange rates. Export price will depend on
exchange rates and this implies that ~, # O. The
signs of the ~, coefficients reveal the way
markups vary with changes in the exchange rate.
A negative (positive) ~ indicates that import
demand is less (more) convex than the constantJ. Agr. and Apphed Econ,, December, 1994 411
elasticity demand curve, and thdt exchange rate
changes are not (more than) fully reflected in
import prices,
Alternative Hypothesis 2, HA: L, # O
The country effect, L,, measures the component of
the markup factor that differs across destinations
when a monopolistic exporter can segment
markets. Such price discrimination will not vary
in response to exchange rate changes if there is
constant elasticity of demand in the importing
country (Knetter). In this case ~, are not
significantly different from zero, but the country
effects (X,) show that prices differ across
destinations,5
Equation (5) is estirndted for three
different sets of export prices: U.S. Long Grain
Rice, U.S. Parboil Rice, and Thai Long Grain
Rice, The export prices are unit f,a,s. values of
shipments to various destinations, All data are
quarterly from 1980 through 1987, Since the
short-run pricing decision is the focus of this
study, nominal exchange rates were used for all
regressions. As suggested by Knetter, the
exchanges rates are “normalized” by dividing each
observation by the value for the first observation.
This allows comparison of the ~ coefficients
across destinations. The dummy variables for first
quarter of 1980 and for Saudi Arabia are dropped,
so that time effects are measured relative to
1980:1 and country effects show how high or low
export prices are relative to Saudi Arabia. Data
sources include: U.S. Bureau of the Census: U.S.
Exports Schedule E, Commodity by Destination;
Bank of Thailand Quarterly Bulletin; the
International Monetary Fund: International
Financial Statistics; and Eurostatistic: Data for
Short-Term Economic Analysis.
Generalized least squares estimates of
coefficients arc generated by using a cross-
sectionally heteroskcdastic and timewise
autoregressive model (Judge et al; Kmenta, pp.
618-622). A two-stage transformation first
corrects for heteroskedasticity across markets and
then for autocorrelation over time in each market.
Separate estimates of p, are used to transform the
observations within cross-sections. An Iterative
procedure is used to produce maximum likelihood
estimates for the p,.
Results
The regression analysis identified market
segments where price behavior is consistent with
market imperfections, Regression results are
reported in tables 3 and 4,C Significant positive
and negative country effects indicate that prices in
the import market are higher or lower,
respectively, than the omitted country dummy.
Significant exchange rate coefficients indicate
plicing to market, and the positive sign for the
significant ~ reported here indicates the exporter’s
effort to capture greater monopoly rent in the
destination market,7 The F1 and F2 tests
reported in tables 3 and 4 reject the null
hypotheses of competitwe pricing. Thus all three
equations showed evidence of noncompetitive
pricing, through imperfect exchange rate pass-
through and price discrimimdtion across markets.
In the discussion that follows, the regression
results are associated with market characteristics.
US. Pm’hoiied Rice .Exporl$
The product differentiation of U.S.
parboil rice arising from the special packaging and
brand name recognition (e.g., Uncle Ben’s)
undoubtedly contributes to U.S. market power in
this segment of the rice trade. There is evidence
of price discrimination across markets for US.
parboil exports, as the EC and Saudi Arabia
consistently received lower export prices than
Canada and the Ivory Coast during the 1980s,
Lower prices could reflect relatively
elastic demand compared to the other two
destinations, the exercise of monopsony power by
the importer, or an effort by the exporter to gain
market share, Exports to the EC rmy have been
priced lower in a bid to gain market share. In the
mid to late 1980s, effective sales promotion has
contributed to an increase in US, exports to EC
(Rastegan-Hennebcrry). Price discrimination for
Saudi Arabia parboiled rice purchases could be
attributed to monopsony in that it is the largest
buyer of US, parboiled ncc, accounting for over
one-third of total US. parboil exports from 1980
to 1986 (Ch]lds).
The U.S. parboiled rice results also
show monopolistic pricing in the form of
imperfect exchange rate pass-through for exports412 Yumkell(r, Unnevehr rwd GrrtcuI No)lcompe(rttve Pricing and Exchange Rate Pass-Through
Table 3. Generalized Ledst Squares Results for U.S. Export Pr]cc RegressIonsa
Parbml Rice
EC Canada Ivory Coast %uch Arabia
Country Etfect -0.3039 0,3025 0.4437 .,,
(-4.2945*) (3.7071”) (4.9798*)
k
Exchange Rate -0.2976 1.8083 -0.3168 0,7840
P (-1,4380) (2.2020*) (1.8343) (1.0605)
R-square = .8183
Dorbm-Watson = 2.01
Breusch-Pagan = 52.52 (39 dt)
F1 = 2.90” (4,92 df)
F2 = 20.28” (3,92 dt)
Long Groin Rice
EC Canada Ivory Coast Iraq Saudi Ardbla
Country Effect -0,3377 -(),2035 -0.0999 -0,2397
x (-3.1635*) (-1.4914) (-0.9489) (-2.4188*)
Exchange Rate 0.22126 2.0093 0.37634 0,5120 3.4096
P (1.0337) (1.8224) (2,2975*) (0.2941) (2.6327*)
R-squme = .6859
Durbin-Walson = 1,97
Breusch-Pagan = 45.75 (41 cR]
FI = 2.7651* (5,123 dt>
F2 = 3,0600” (4, 123 df)
a The numbers m parentheses are t stikishcs. The astcrmks (*) indicate t statistics and F stahstlcs
signithnt at the 0,05 level. FI is the F statkmc for H; ~, = O; F2 is the F stat]sfic for HO: k, = 0. 8
coeffments are not reported due to space hmtcdtions.
to Canada, The positive ~ coefficient reveals that
markups are adjusted upward by 18.1 percent for
a 10 percent appreciation in the U.S. dolk. Such
pricing behavior indicates very inelastic demand
in Canada for parboiled rice of U.S. origin.
U.S. Long Grain Exports
The U.S. long grain rice trade shows
evidence of monopolistic pricing in the form of
price discrimination across destinations, Prices
are consistently lower for the EC and Iraq than
for Canada, Ivory Coast, and Saudi Arabia.
Further evidence of monopolistic pricing is found
in the significant ~ coefficients for US.
shipments of long grain rice to Saudi Arabia and
the Ivory Coast. Markups increase by 34.1
percent and 3,8 percent in Saudi Arabia and Ivory
Coast, respectively, for a 10 percent appreciation
in the U.S. dollar.*
US. market power in these two
destinations can be explained in part by special
credit arrangements with Saudi Arabia and
conccssional sales to Ivory Coast. These credit
arrangements essentially become an agreement to
buy rice from only U.S. suppliers since the credits
can only be applied to rice from the U.S. In theJ Agr, and Apphed .Ycon,, December, 1994 413
Table 4. Gcneralizecl Least Squarm Results for Thai Export Price Regress]onsa
Long Grnm Rme
Hong Kong Singapore Malaysia Saudi Arabia
Country Effect 0.0001 0.0123 -0.1989 ,..
k (O0036) (0,2366) (-3,8356*)
Exchange Rate 0.3249 0,2173 -0.3041 1.048
P (1.7713) (0.9948) (-0.6870) (2,5841”)
R-square = ,850
Dwbm-Watson = 1.97
Breusch-Pagan = 55,81 (39 M)
F1 = 3.72* (4,92 (M)
F2 = 9.56* (3,92 dfj
‘ See mble 3 for an explanatmn of the table.
Saudi market, the U,S. supplies about half of the
imports, due to both the credit arrangements, and
its reliability as a regular supplier of high quality
rice, One company is the main U.S. supplier of
imported rice to this rndrket, and industry experts
claim that a strong clientele base hm been
developed over several years because of consistent
and regular supply of high-quality rice, U.S.
commercial exports to Ivory Coast are relatively
small and very recent, However, the significant ~
could be attributed to the influence of
confessional sales, which account for over half of
U.S. exports to Ivory Coast,
Thai Long Grain Rice Exports
The results show price discrimination for
Thai long grain rice exports. Malaysia received
lower export prices than other Thai markets
during the 1980s. This may be induced by
Malaysian government policy which has sought to
diversify its sources of rice imports, J3aharumsha
observed that in order to reduce the risk of over-
dependence on Thailand for all of its imports,
Malaysia has recently diversified its source of
imports to include Pakistan, Burma, and China,
Charging lower prices in Malaysia could be an
attempt by Thai exporters to avoid Malaysian
government import restrictions and to hold on [o
market share.
Another interesting finding is that both
the U.S. and Thailand seem to be able to extract
rent in the Saudi Arabian market for long grain
rice when exchange rates change, m the fl
coefilcients are significant in both equations.
Interviews with industry experts revealed that the
Saudi Arabian market is segmented. There is
strong preference for Basmati rice in the Eastern
part of the country and strong preference for U.S.
rice in the Western half, Others suggest that
fhr-ther segmentation arises due to the large
populations of Pakistmi, Indian, Bangladeshi, and
Philippine immigrant workers in Saudi Arabia,
This Asian population along with some Saudi
nationals is the main consuming block of the rice
imports from Asian countries, such as Thailand,
Pakistan, and India, Hence, since the U.S. and
Thailand exporters operate within somewhat
separate high income markets, with inelastic
demands, it is possible for them to price
discriminate without concern for loss of market
share,
Conclusions
The evidenqe from this study identifies
noncompetitive pricing in one segment of the
international rice market, high and middle income
markets with continuous demand for imports.
Price discrimination across destinations is found414 Yumkella, CInnevehr und Gurcza, Nancompetitile Ptwing and E.rchange Rate Pass- Throug}l
for U.S. and Thai long grain exports and U.S.
parboil exports. While quality differences could
account for some of the price variation across
destinations, structural Charldcterlstics In somt!
markets (i.e., tied sales) also provide opportunities
for noncompetitive pricing, Stronger evidence of
noncompetitive pricing is found in imperfect
exchange rate pass-through observed in three out
of the eight importing countries (Saudi Arabia, for
both U.S. and Thai long grain exports, Ivory
Coast for U.S. long grain rice, and Canada for
U.S, parboil rice).
Do our results indicate that the whole
international rice market is noncompetltivc? It is
important to note that this study only covered high
quality rice exports by U.S. and Thailand in
selected markets with regular trade. The markets
considered accounted for 34 percent of U.S.
exports, and thus much of the U,S. trade can be
characterized as noncompetitive. However, the
total volume of imports considered here (i.e,, the
combined imports of U.S. long grain and parboil
rice and Thai long grain rice m the selected
destirmtions) ranged from 1,1 million metric tons
in 1980 to 1,4 million metric tons in 1987, or 7.4
percent to 11.1 percent of total world Imports.
Hence, while evidence of market power is
provided in certain market segments for high
quality rice, one cannot conclude that the entire
international rice market is noncompetitive, Thus
our tindings qualify, rather than refute, those of
Petzel and Monke or Un.
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Endnotes
1. Falcon and Monke identified countries with average rice imports of more than 200,000 metric tons
per year from 1961 to 1977, and ail were in Asia, with the exception of USSR and Cuba. Countries
averaging imports of more than 200,000 metric tons per year between 1970 and 1987 include seven new
entrants, all outside of Asia: EC, Nigeria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, IVOIY Coast, Senegal, and Iraq (Yumkella).416 Yumkella, Wnnevehr ond Garcia: Noncompe[i(ive Prtcmg and Exchange A’a(e Pass- lhrough
2. The Ivory Coast varies its sources ofricc supply substantially from year to year. Thailand supplied
no exports to the Ivory Coast in 4 of the 9 years examined. Other suppliers include Pakistan, Burma,
and Vietnam. In 1990, the U.S. provided nearly half of rice imports to Ivory Coast, probably as a result
of confessional sales, Unlike the other selected markets, the Ivory Coast is not tied to a particular
source for reliable quality.
3. Some importing countries, such as the F3C,Saudi Arabia, and Canada, import from different sources
because there are populations of different ethnic origins, In fact, the U.S. has been importing growing
quantities of Thai rice for consumers of Asian heritage.
4. Singularity is avoided by dropping the first quarter of 1980 for the time dummies and one country
dummy for each regression. The intercept term, LX, captures the first quarter of 1980 for the omitted
country, The time effects, 0,, capture variables that would have a common impact in each time period
on all destination markets. Such variables include marginal cost of exporters, general inflationary trends
in world markets and omitted variables.
5. Such price differences could reflect unmeasured differences in cost across destinations, due for
example, to systematic differences in quality, Thus significant country effects do not necessarily
indicate noncompetitive pricing.
6. The Durbin-Watson statistics indicate no first-order serial correlation in the corrected residuals. The
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test accepts homoskedasticity at the 1 and 5 percent levels for the U.S.
regressions. For the Thai regression, homoskedasticity is accepted at the 1 percent leveL,but marginally
rejected at the 5 percent level,
7. A negative ~ would be consistent with exporter pricing to mmket to defend market share. In such
cases the exporter attempts to maintain Sudbleprices by reducing the effect of importers’ currency
devaluation in markets where there are other competing suppliers.
8. The ~ coefficient for Iraq also might be expected to be significant since the U.S. is so dominant in
that market. However, the exchange rate between the Iraqi currency and the U.S. dollar did not vary
much during the study period, and hence there was little opportunity for pricing to market through
incomplete exchange rate pass-through.